Political ideas of Harold J. Laski. by Kim, Yŏng-jun
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1961
Political ideas of Harold J. Laski.
Yŏng-jun Kim
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Kim, Yŏng-jun, "Political ideas of Harold J. Laski." (1961). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2558.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2558

/
i
FOLITICiiL IDEAS OK HaROLD J. LaSKI
nmu
YOUNQ JUN KIM
Bachelor c»’ arts TRINITY UNIVERSITY
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PaKTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE RE(4UIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE CF MikSTER OF ARTS
UNIVERSITY OF MaSSACHUSETIS, AMHLHST
MAY 20, 1961
TABLE OP CONTENTS
Page
INTKOLUCTIOi 1
THE NATURE OP THPi STATE • • . . 9
La8kl *8 Attack on the Uoniatlc Theory cf State
Pluralistic Nature of Society
The Aim of the State
THE NATIVE OF AUTHORITY 33
The Source of Authority
Authority and Liberty
The Problem of Obedience
LIBERTY aNL EQUALITY 46
Laakl *8 Concept of Liberty
Ko Gnomic Equality and Liberty
SOCIALISM CP LASKI 62
CONCLUSION 76
i
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
ProfesBor Laskl has been one of the most controversial
figures In the history of modem political theory. His
which dealt with the problems he actually had faced
^
ranged over wide areas embracing pluralism, Fabianism, and
Marxist socialism. As an able biographer has put It, ”he
was Interested In the history of political Ideas and relations
of current events and the problems to a theory of government.**^
Laskl *B Influence as a teacher on the minds of young students
In England and iimerlca, as well as of those from Afro-Aslan
countries seems to have been great Indeed.
During the fifty-seven years of his life (1893-1950)
,
Laskl witnessed the tragic drama of two world wars. He saw
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. He observed how the triumph
of Democracy after World War ,I was soon challenged by the
rising menace of Nazism In the Continental Europe. He also
experienced the Great Depression of 1930s, and the accompany-
ing misery of the mass of people, which seems to have aroused
his sense of Justice against the prevailing social injustice.
All such historical Incidents could not escape the per-
ceptive mind of Harold Laskl without challenging him to fight
for the preservation of Individual freedom against the en-
croaching totalitarian philosophy, and for the promotion of
^Kingsley Martin, Harold Laskl (New York: The Viking
Press, 1963), p. 44.
2Individual happlnesa by providing the neoeeaary political,
social, and economic conditions. Since most of Laski'a
writings had direct bearings on contemporary world affairs,
it would be desirable to understand the historical back-
ground behind the particular political ideas of Laskl. How-
ever the task of understanding such background would have to
be loft largely to each reader of this paper.
Democracy is, today, challenged by another form of total-
itarian philoso{^y. Often it has been questioned, especially
among young intellectuals, whether the democratic philosophy
could survive this serious challenge. It is the opini<^ of
the writer of this paper that democracy as i^ilosophy has
reached low ebb today due to the two decades of repose prior
to World War II, and it is necessary to revive the principle
of democracy as a philosophy in order to meet the new chal-
lenge successfully.
In this context, I would like to analyze the political
ideas of Professor iaski, whose early writings dealt mainly
with the problems of democracy. Hence, this paper is primarily
focused on the years between 1914 and 1951. During this
period Laskl was a strong exponent of the cause of libera-
lism and individualism. However, In order to show the politi-
cal philosophy of Laskl in a fuller picture, one chapter is
devoted to the discussion of Laskl as a near-Marxian socialist
after 1932
3Harold J. Laski was bom on June 30, 1893 as the second
son ot Nathan and Sarah Laakl* His father was a prosperous
cotton shipper and s leader of the Jewish community In the
city of Manchester* It Is said that the young Laskl as a
boy experienced Inner conflict between his liberal sentiment
and a strict Judaic dogma* This religious upbringing seems
1
to have played an Important role In the formation of his
character and future outlook* Judaism Is, In a sense, a way
of life directed toward a sense of Messianic mission* "Con-
scious from his youth that his Jewishness set him apart from
the main stream of his society, he felt a strong Impi^lse to
become the ally of ell those vdiose want. Ignorance, and misery
were hidden behind the placid facade of the Victorian era,
and who could be therefore Ignored by the successful and oon-
„2
tented* It would not be too much to say that Laskl *s pre-
cocity In Intellectual development was largely due to the
Judaic tradition of early training which could well have help-
ed his amazing power of memory and argumentative quickness*
In 1910 Laskl won a scholarship at New College, Oxford*
iit this time he was still Interested In the field of biology,
especially in eugenics. In which he displayed a remarkable
talent In a short period of learning* The following year
Laskl sedretly married Frida Kerry, a gentile* fthen the mar-
^Herbert A* Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J* Laskl
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 6.
4rlage was discovered by his parents, they did not permit him
to live with his newly wedded wife for his three remaining
years at Oxford* However, the marriage was a happy one for
both of them, since they married not only because they loved,
but also hoped together to pursue common Ideals of human re-
generation*
After Laskl moved to Oxford, his Interest began to turn
to the field of history^ In his formative years, he studied
under such celebrated teachers as Sir Paul Vlgnogradoff
,
Pro-
fessor of Jurisprudence; Sir Ernest Barker; Herbert Albert
Laurens Plsher, who lectured In history; end Frederic ttllllam
Maitland, legal historian. The Influence of Maitland especial-
ly was great to Laskl in providing him with the basis of
pluralism* Laskl also joined the ranks of the Fabian Society
at this period, but his action and philosophy were rather
moderate than militant* This basic temper remained with him
throughout his life, and even after he identified himself as
a Marxist after 1932 his belief was in a revolution by consent
idilch would not sacrifice the Western democratic tradition.
In 1914, upon finishing his finals at Oxford, he accepted
an Invitation by George Lansbury to work for the lallX
a labor publication* He wrote many articles on behalf
of the
labor movement during this time* Whe World Aer I
began, his
^Martin, op* clt *, p* 17
6attempt to enlist failed on medical grcunds. then ac-
cepted an Invitation to lecture at hcOlll University In
Itontreal and soon his life on the iimerlcan continent began*
After a brief stay at koulll University, Laskl was ap-
pointed as an Inatnicter at Harvard University In 1916. dy
1918 his scholarship waa widely recognized end his foundation
was set firmly In the academic world. Beside tutoring at
Harvard, Laskl devoted much of his time to the study of law,
which contributed later to his analysis of the nature of
sovereignty.
Liberal as he was, and as he alweys tried to relate his
theory to actual problems, he could not stay aloof in the
Boston Police strike of 1919. Luring the strike, he candidly
expressed his sympathy for tliose who protested. The consequence
of his stand and experience during the strike were of great
Importance in molding a new outlook In his pi-illoaophy . He
saw how the propertied class united to defend Its Interests
even by employing force, and how the legal system in capitalist
society worked for the vested Interest. "In short, Harold
discovered at first hand the weakness of the liberal philo-
sophy In which he had been brought up end took a long step
towards a predcmlnantly Marxist view, the examination and
elaboration of which was to be the principal substance of his
„4
future thinking.
^Ibld.
,
p. 37.
6In the fiummer of 19£;0, JUskl returned to London to tc-
cept a teaching poaltlon at the London School of Economics.
This, was the period during which nyany liberal e ware facing
unprecedented challenges; Laski found many people unemployed
in the midst of economic depression. The foundation of demo-
cracy shaken by the challenge of a totalitarian philosophy.
And the next decade ended in failure in achieving any genuine
allience between the ifcest and Soviet Russia to defend them-
selves against the threat of Hasi egression. It was in the
early 19^0s that Laski began to turn to practical politics
and began to be interested in economics. Vihen the Great De-
pression of 1929 hit the world with an unprecedented blow,
he began to concede the weakness of pluralism as a means of
realizing a just society, oecause pluralism failed to provide
a strong central authority? which could carry out basic social
reform.
The defection of Ramsey fcacLonald convinced Laski that
social revolution thi-ough Parllainentary measures was a dif-
ficult, if not impossible, task. After this incident, the
left wing of the Labor Party, including Laski himself, gave
up its traditional optimism and ciianged to a more militant
outlook in social reform, after that Laski engaged in party
politics more actively while teaching at the same time in the
School of Economics. It was his deep conviction that academic
theory must be related to practical politics. This w'as also
7said to be the founding philosophy of the School of hcono-
mlcs •
Luring rtorld War II, Laskl saw an opportunity for a
revolution by consent, since, according to him, a war general*
ly brings a great Intermingling of the class and property
relations* Thus during the war, he continuously emphasized
the need for a new social order in the post-war period and
not to return to the old order.
In 1942, at the annual party conference In London Laskl
said in part, ”the age of competitive capitalism is over.
A democracy means nothing mox« than a society of equals plan-
ning production for community consumption.’*^ This view was
a considerable change from his earlier philosophy, but one
should not make a hasty judgment of labeling him an orthodox
Marxist. For example, Laskl looked to ^resident Roosevelt,
not Stalin, for the realization of just society in post-war
world. Thus when Liski heard the news of Roosevelt’s death,
he wrote to Justice Frankfurter in part, "this is a blow
almost beyond words. If you know how much 1 had counted on
him for the first years of peace..." From this, it would not
be too much to say that he was a liberal democrat, at least
in the method he wished to employ to realize the egalitarian
society he had In his mind. Laskl did not approve the Russian
^ Ibld ., p. 154.
^Ibld., p. 158.
8authoritarianism, but he was rather generous to Kussla in
the sense that he urged us to see the revolution in a longer
historical perspective, ^ie viewed the Russian revolution as
an Inheritor of the French Revolution and he hoped liberty
would prevail in future years.
In the American scene, Laski emphasized the need for the
birth of a labor party similar to that which existed in
England. What he wanted was to bring American political
parties to a closer alignment to their ideological base.
Laski believed that the two parties in America were both con-
servative in their nature, and unable to represent the real
Interests of the working class.
OHiiPlER II
THE NiiTUhE OF THE STiiTE
l4i8lci*B i.ttaok on the
Monlstlo Theory of State
The monistic theory of the state came under the severe
criticism of Laski. His early writings were primarily direct-
ed to attack the monistic theory. To him this theory wiis
against the basic principle of liberal tradition. Monlsts
in general viewed society as a single unit in which individual
members have meaning only In relation to the whole. Such a
view of a state thus contained the possibility of Justifying
the absolute obedience of the people to the state under the
name of unity. Although the existence of numerous groups
within a society might be recognized, their interests should
be subordinated to that of the state for the purpose of main-
taining social order and harmony.
The origin of this philosophy could be traced back as
far as the Oreek Polls, when Plato expounded the existence of
absolute idea, and when Aristotle wrote of the supreme power
of the state. Hence, it could be said that the seeds for
the emergence of Leviathan state were sown already twenty-
five centuries ago. This basic idea was inherited by the
Roman Republic and Empire. It was again inherited by such men
,
^bes in modern times, and the very philosophy
as bodln and Hobv
became the midwife, in large degree, at the birth of the
modem nation state.
9
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It Is necessary to discuss the philosophical founda-
tion of the monistic theory of the state In order to under-
stand what Laokl was attacking, and whore It was that he
departed from this monism In developing his Ideqs of pluralism.
As mentioned briefly above, the origin of the monistic theory
of state was found In the Idealism of Plato. The essence of
Platonic Idealism was Its acceptance of the absolute Ideei
which was perfect and the model of everything that ought to
be, as an autonomous reality. Plato believed In the existence
of a complete and perfect universe which embodied the perfect
state. This metaphysical Ideal was more real than that which
we could perceive through our senses. To Plato this eternal
Idea was the thought of god.
Plato also derived the concept of the organic view of
society, where order, harmony, and unity prevail, from the
experience of the Greek city state. Due to Its small size
and the relatively simple nature of Its political and economic
structure, and also due to the comparatively homogeneous nature
of the Interests of Its citizen, the city-state demonstrated
sufficiently the desirability of order and harmony In unity.
Hegel later shared a similar belief In the existence of
the Idea of absolute. Thus Hegel argued that we were all
parts of this absolute whole and each Individual had meaning
only within the context of this organic whole, namely the
state. Since he beatified the state to such a degree, the
to have led him to regard the state asInherent logic seems
11
an end In Itself rather than the means to realize Individual
happiness. Such a logical deduction was derived from meta-
physical assumptions (which Laskl of course rejected) such
as, (1) the whole Is greater than the sum of the Individual
parts, (2) the whole is prior to the parts, and (3) the whole
is more real than the parts. Laskl rejected the Idealism
which was based on such metaphysical assumptions on the ground
that It never enabled us to come to grips with facts. In
Laskl 's opinion, those Idealists thought so largely in terms
of a beneficent teleology to soften the distinction between
political oppositions', idealism beatified the status quo by
regarding each element as an integral part of a process, which
it insisted on viewing as a totality.
The organic view of society led even a man like Rousseau,
who was extremely liberal in his early thinking, to accept
totalitarian philosophy. His concept of the General Will
became a seedbed, in later days, for the growth of totali-
tarian philosophy, because obedience of individuals to the
General Will, whatever it may be, was required even by use
of coercive means. Obviously, when the conformity to a
certain view was required by the state (which is comprised
of small group of persons) by the use of force if necessary,
the concept of the General Will becomes authoritarian in its
nature.
Laskl rejected this concept of General Will on the
ground that, first of all, "if if'means that right must prevail,
18
it dwells in the realm of purpose without necessarily
effecting realization.” Secondly, It is difficult to ac-
cept the assumption that the majority will Is always right.
If It means majority will by the Qeneral Will. And thirdly.
It should be added that there is no way of assuring that a
government Is acting according to the Qeneral Will, since a
government consists of a small group of men not differing
from any other man.
In rejecting the view of society as an organic whole
which embodies the General Will, Laskl argued as follows In
part:
IVhen we accept the Idea of the state as an organism,
what Is emphasized Is subjection of its parts to the
welfare of the whole. But In sober fact, the welfare
of the state means nothing if it does not mean the
concrete happiness of its members. In that aspect, the
concept of an organism Is, as Dr. McTaggart brilliantly
Insisted, Inapplicable. For the Individual regards
himself as an end not less than he so regards the state;
and we are here again c onfoutideifl by the Important fact
of refusal of absorption Into the whole that Is greater
than ourselves.^
In his book. Studies In the Problems of Sovereignty, Laskl
discussed extensively why he had to reject Hegel's meta-
physical concept of state. In fact, as shown above, Laskl 's
approach to the nature of the state was a pragmatic one. He
Insisted that we accept the authority of the state because
we find some goodness In Its Intentions. In this light, the
^Laskl, Liberty In the Modern State , p. 17.
^Laskl, Authority In the Modern State , pp. 34-35.
. 1
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right of the individual could not be derived from the meta-
physical assuraptiona, but rather from the awareness of the
Individual as to what confititutea his happineas.
For the purpose of coordinating different interests of
individuals and associations, there must be a single authority
in any society* The state, thus, has to have a superior
power over all the other associations to make and execute
laws. This we call legal sovereignty, and it is by definition
absolute and unlimited in a sense that there can be no legal
power within a state superior to it, and that there can be
no legal limit to the law-making power of the state* In this
absolute nature of sovereignty. La ski saw an inherent danger
to individual freedom* An absolute legal sovereignty was,
to Laski, to constrain the members of society to a certain
unity* Ihe monistic state, in which the power was concen-
trated into a single center, based on such a concept of
sovereignty was both "administratively and ethically inade-
quate," to Laski, because in such a centralized organization,
a government would find it difficult to understand the dif-
ferent Interests within the society* Also in such a society,
individuals would become less responsible in their political
activity, because the problems they encountered would not
be felt to be immediate or personal to each member of the
society*
^Laskl, The Foundation of Sovereignty * p* 240
14
tJio notion of sovopoligntyj
observing that sovereignty wos secure only when it wss ex-
ercised with responsibility, and legal sovereignty was by
definition unlimited and, therefore, irresponsible. Since
he did not accept the assumption that a government at any
historical moment represented the interests of the society
as a whole, it seemed very dangerous to him to give such
an absolute power to a governn»nt based on the theory of
legal sovereignty* A stste based on such a legal theory of
sovereignty would disregard the capa.oity of individuals or
groups of people to judge the policies of the state. On
this subject, Laakl argued as follows:
The monistic theory of the state, making it
sovereign and, therefore, absolute, runs counter to
some of the deepest convictions we can possess. I have
argued that it will ask from us sacrifices it is
against our oonsclenoe to give... .
In the monistic theory of the state there seems no
guarantee that roan will have any being at all* His
personality, for him the most real of all things, would
prove to hove feet of clay.'
All in all, the concept of sovereignty in the Austlnian
sense would produce servility among the people, if it were
applied. Thus he argued that it was necessary to divide or
decentralise government in order to prevent such servility.
Unified opinion and well-ordered society might mean nothing
else than a predominance of the interests of a single group
which happened to command the authority of the state. In
^Leski, Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty, pp.
221 k 24 *
16
®oclcty It is natural tliat th.ep6 would be many dlverae
opinions and Interests If these were left to the free ex-
pression of the people* Instead of making the opinion of
one group of people prevail predominantly, what Laski wanted
was to balance and coordinate many diverse and different
opinions end interests by admitting the right of their own
existence apart from the encroaching power of the powerful
state*
The liberal sentiment of Laski was incompatible with
A
the idealism which claimed that conformity to a code, and
even a compulsory obedience to it, was the very essence of
freedom* The monistic view of the state seemed to Laski to
imply not only the paralysis of individuality* To him each
of us is ultimately different from all others, and that is
the ultimate fact of human experience* The idealists, in
Laski *8 opinion, failed to see the fact that people who lived
differently also thought differently and that in so varied
a civilization as ours an absolute standard for human conduct
was out of place*
To Laski, in the Foundation of Sovereignty , a society
is not based on the identical interests of its members,
therefore it is difficult to assume that a government, which
usually represents the interest of an economically superior
group in the society, would act for the Interests of society
as a whole* This argument is not necessarily substantiated
in the workings of modern representative institutions, which
16
can. In most cases, reflect various Interests of different
groups in a given society, but since LasVci believed thst
a government at any historical moment represented only the
interests of a Dingle group--whlch dominated the economic
apparatus of the state — he thought it was desirable to
limit the authority of government in order to safeguard the
basic right of the individual.
Lecentralization of governance for the promotion of
Individual happiness was incompatible with the idea of legal
sovereignty in the Austinian sense. Thus the argument he
proposed for the purpose of • promoting individual happiness
was his pluralism. Between 1914 end 1925, it was his inten-
tion to exploit the pluralistic nature of society to counter-
act the evils of totalitarian philosophy which had begun to
gain momentum in states like Germany and Italy. In that
sense, Laski's argument for pluralism should be seen as his
crusade against the increasing threat to individual freedom.
Pluralistic bature of Society
The core of pluralism is in the acceptance of the pro-
mise that the parts of the state are as real and as self-
sufficient as the state Itself. According to Laskl;
fce do not proceed from the state to the parts of
the state, from the One to Many, on the ground that
the state is more unified than its parts. On the con-
trary, wo are forced to the admission that the perts are ^
as real, as primary, and as self-sufficient as the whole.
^Laskl, The Foundation of Bovereignty , p. 169
17
Ihis Idea was almost diametrically opposed to the concept
of the monistic tneory of state, Laskl thought that indi-
vidual happiness could best be promoted by admitting this
pluralistic nature of society, and by incorporating this
principle in the system of government,
Although pluralism has been considered to bo Laski's
profound contribution to political theory, he was deeply
indebted to some preceding thinkers — to the Influence
of Me Taggart, Hobert Mac Iver
,
and especially Frederic
W, Maitland who said, ”our fellowship is no fiction, no
symbol, no piece of state machine ly, but a living organism
and real person This idea was of great importance to
La ski in the formulation of his ideas on pluralism.
To Laskl, modem society consisted of many different
interest groups. And the government in such a society
usually represented the interest of economically superior
groups. Therefore, it was necessary to have a less power-
ful oentral government and to have many associations which
were powerful enough to influence the central government,
(However his distrust of a strong central government under-
went a considerable modification when he later adopted a
near-Marxist view, and when he realized that any measure
for basic social reform could only be fulfilled under a
strong central government. This point will be discussed
further in Chapter Five which will treat of Laskl *s
Socialism,
)
18
According to the pluraliEts In generr.l^ assoclatlone
spring spontaneously froa the free play of huraan activity.
They are not sumraoned l^r fiat
,
nor are they the product of
one central source. Since associations are independent of
one another in their origin, they must have equality and
freedom in their activities. Since men reach out for ends
plural in their nature, the structure of society must he
likewise, and governrcont must be organized to accomodate
this pluralistic nature of society. Since there are many
conflicting wills within a society, a group of people who
share ainiilar interests form an association in order to
advance their wants mere effectively. Laski put the nature
of associations as follows:
The group is an attempt to advance some interest
in which its members feel an answer to the wants
of their experience. They are original functions
of the envirenment* They are an effort so to
adjust that the individual can by its moans feed
impulses which, otherwise, are either starved or
Inadequately nourished, ihe group is real in the
same sense as the state is real. The state does
not call It into being. It Is not, outlsde the cate-
gories of lew, dependent upon the state. It grows
in the whole environment as a natural response to
factors in that environment. It lives end moves
as its surrounding circumstances seem to warrant.'
Laski *8 argument to prove the spontaneous growth and
the autonomous existence of associations was extensive and
detailed. For example, in his brilliant essay, "The Poli-
York:
^Leslie Llpson, The Greet Issues
1964), p. 148.
Laski, Oramrner of Foil tics , pp.
of Politics (New
256-256.
19
tlcal Theory of the Disruption" which enalyted the
secession movement of the Church of Scotland in 1843,
Laskl attempted to show that in truth the Churches lived
lives of their own, independent and self-contained, and
that they would not tolerate any harmful external inter-
ference*
In the essay Laekl pointed out that, as the pressure
of Interference on the Church of Scotland by the state in-
creased, "the Church* ••is compelled to seek the protection
of its liberties lest it becomes no more than the religious
depertment of an otherwise secular organization*"® Thus the
Oenerul Assembly of the Established Church of England, led
by the moderator. Dr* Welsh, in order to protect the freedom
of the Church on ecclesiastical matters, protested to the
state in 1643 by foxming its own government headed by Dr*
Chalmers* This raised the question of supremacy between the
state and Church* If one takes the side of the traditional
legal theory of liie state, there would not be any question,
since the answer is so obvious* However, when the Church
claimed exemption from the jurisdiction of the state based
on the concept of societas perfects , the question arose:
"is the state but one of many, or ere those many but parts
of Itself, the One?"^°
^Laski, Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty , pp. 27-68.
®lbid *, pp. 27-28.
^^Ibid*. p. 28.
20
This was the fight of the ohurch against the notion
of an all inclusive unitary state. To the Presbyterians,
"it seemed obvious that the society to which they belonged
was no mere cog-wheel in the machinery of the state, cJestin-
ed to work in harmony with its motions. They felt the strength
of personality which...was complete awl self-sufficient."^^
By 1074, the state admitted the Church was right in its
claim, and the’ supremacy of the parliament on the matter
of ecclesastic al freedom was denied. Prom this fact, "it
may throw to the winds that omnicompetent State for which
Hegel in Germany and Austin in England have long and firmly
stood the sponsors.
According to Laski, such associati cns -- for example,
the Church cf England as shown above — were developing
functional self-government, thereby working out their own
rules and customs. In his develoimient of pluralism, Laski
aimed at the functional decentralisation of government. By
this he expected to remedy some defects of the modern repre-
ssntat ive ins titut ion
•
According to his understanding, the mass of people
was not sufficiently informed on political matters in making
a rational judgment in an election. The public opinion that
might well sway the outcome of an election was not necess-
^^Ibid .. p. 66.
^^Ibid.. p. 68.
21
arlly the product of reason* Moreover, the problems that
the legislators woxUd face were extremely complicated and
highly technical in their nature, thereby causing the legis-
lators difficulty in coordinating different Interests in the
society, ard also making it difficult for the general electors
to understand them* Also, the modern legislative body is so
overburdened with many minute problems that it is hampered
in performing its basic functions. Thus Laskl seems to
suggest that such minute and technical problems could be
solved better by those who were directly related to them,
and that the legislative body should handle only those pro-
blems which were concerned with general principles*
Once the functional decent rail zaticn was introduced,
each association would see a problem based on its own inter-
ests and environment* Since such a problem would be of direct
interest to the association, it would have clearer understand-
ing as to what could be the best solution for its own inter-
ests* For example, the miners and mine owners have different
interests to pursue; when they have certain disputes, in order
to reach a common solution that is satisfactory to both parties,
the experience of both parties must have equal validity*
Only then can the solution bo a real one, and generally such
a solution is bettor than one made by the representative body
which usually reflects the interests of certain groups*
Everybody's experience must be shared in the making of govern-
ment declolons* That means that everybody has a right to bo
22
consulted In tiie making of the decisions And Laskl
believed that the system of functional decentralisation
was the beat means to achieve this purpose. On this matter,
Laskl said In pert, ”the consultation of experience there-
fore means the right to participate In the making of decisions.
For any order that is issued without my sharing will bo an
order for those who make it, and not for me... Therefore
to Laskl a government which recogiilzes the pluralistic nature
of society was best fit to realise Individual freedom.
In the argument so far advanced for pluralism, the pos-
sibility of anarchy may have been Intimated. It was Laskl *s
belief that one did not have to obey the state, if he felt
a stronger loyalty to the association and found In It moral
claim superior to those of the state:
Everywhere we find groups within the state which
challenge Its supremacy. They are. It may be. In
relations with the state, a part of It; but one
with It they are not. They refuse the reduction
to unity... . Men belong to /the state/; but,
also, they belong to the other groups,, end a
competition for allegiance Is continuously possible.
But It should be noted that Laskl, by setting up limits to
the power and function of associations, attempted to prevent
such a result as political and social anarchy. The power
of association is limited ty the fact that It does not have
^'^Laskl, Qrammar of Politics , p. 248.
^
^Ibld ., p. 246.
^^Laskl, The Foundations of Sovereignty , p. 169.
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the power to inflict corporal punishment upon its members.
It is also limited ly the refusal or willingness of indivi-
dual members to accept its decisions. In his attempt to set
a limit to the functions of associations, LasWl said In part,
the vocational bodies. . .have value for the resolution of
functloial problems; but they are not...built to deal with
the general Issues shlch must be faced by society as a whole.
Thus Laski was not denying the necessity for the exist-
ence of harmony in society. What he was emphasizing was
that the state ought not to claim unity to the degree that
it sacrifices the individual human personality. The unity,
that is to say, if its existence is to be tolerated, must
be such a broad and all-inclusive one that no individuality
of the members cf society is .to be sacrifled.
Laski claimed that each association had its own sover-
eignty within itself, and it should be limited like that of
the state. For example, vocational organizaticns have the
right to solve problems of their own, provided that the
nature of the problems are primarily their own concern. If
the problems were general ones in their nature transcending
the scope of their own interests, they should be dealt with
by a higher organization, namely a government. It is diff-
icult at this point as how to determine the nature of a
certain issue: whether it should be dealt, with by a state
^®I>a8kl, Grammar of Politics , p. 73.
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or by a particular asaociatlon, because no association can
act in Independence; the groupe and associations impinge
upon each other as they pursue their alms, and create a
need for order and harmony* And for the creation and
maintenance of order and harmony, there must exist an
Bssoclaticn to which the remaining associations must be
subordinated*
However, Laski seems to have believed that the start-
ing point should be in the hands of individuals or assoc-
iations who have the sense of right and wrong, because they
usually have more relevant relations with any particular
issue* Only after all the pragmatic experiments by the in-
dividuals and groups fail, should the state, which is more
inclusive and has a higher moral claim, tackle the problem*
In such cases, each individual should pay careful scrutiny
in crder to prevent any misjudgment by the government, be-
cause a gDvernment is after all made of a small group of
people who are not, in essence, different from any other
people* The government, which contains the federal nature
of society, provides bettor channels for the operation of
an active consent of the people than any other method. The
encouragement of decentralization on a geographical and
functicnal base would help to create the sense of respon-
sibility among men, as well a a the self-government which
ia essential to the democratic system*
Laski *8 advocacy of guild socialism was abandoned.
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however, after 1926 on the ground that It had practical
difficulty In providing the minimum requirement for the
practical unity of government. And another difficulty
with guild aoolallam wee that "there la no assurance that
union of all guilds into a single body will be superior to
the body of territorial representatives."^*^ By and large,
he came to the conclusion that the state was a necessary
organ for the purpose of social, political, and economic
reforms. However, he proposed to check the power of the
state st every level of administrative organization in
18
order to Insure the freedom of Individuals and groups.
As Laaki realized more the need of central govern-
ment with enough power to cqpe with the general issues
of the society, especially after the Great Depression of
1929, he began to move away from pluralism and came closer
to the acceptance of the ministio stand. It was historical
oiroums ttknce that forced not only Laski but also the other
plural Ists such as 0. D. H. Cole to retreat from pluralism.
^*^ Ibld * , p. 84.
^®Mertln, op. cit . , p. 68.
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The Aim of the State
^*®*^^*® concept of the etiite seome to be & oilxture
5 moral approboh in Ito ulm and a pragmatic
one in its practice* he put the theory of the state
in one of his early works; a Uieory of the state must be
examined not so much in the context of claims of authority
but by their actual validation in terms of pi*actlce. his
assumption that trie state existed to promote individual
happiness was an a prl ori assumption, ae he admitted him-
self, but he si^gested that the importance of the assump-
tion was as an index to the achievement of government,
rather than as a definite nature of the state* above all,
when he said that it was helpful to be told that the object
of the state was to secure the good life, the term used as
the object of the state was fundamentally different one from
19
the absolute term used in the school of idealists, which
put the state on higher plane than its members*
Ahile Laski was still a strong exponent of pluralism,
the aim of the state was fixed to prunote the good life of
individual* Even in his later writings, the basic aim of
the state remained the same, although the method to accom-
plish this aim has undergone considerable modification. To
him, tliC only power the goverximent was entitled to exeiclse
^^Laski, authority in tne Modern State , p. 31*
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was the power delegated by the people to fulfill the aim
of the state, that Is to say, to promote the good life*
The state should get the loyalty of people only ty achlev-
£0Ing this pur{)08 e« In order to solve the dilemma which
derives from the concept of state in the idealist school
of thought, to which Xia8kl*8 aim of the state was very
similar, and the practical example of the contrary experi-
ence under the corxupted government, Laskl made a distinc-
tion between the state end the government* Laskl accorded
a higher moral claim to the state, because It had more
Inclusive power than any other association, and also be-
cause he wanted to provide some Index by which to measure
the achievement of a governmental action* To Laskl the
government was composed of a snail group of fallible men;
It was liable to make mistakes, end the Individuals In
society should scrutinize the actions of government by the
Index so provided* By employing such logic, Laskl was able
to deny the monlsts* Insistence on an absolute claim to the
authority of the state*
In some aspects, Laskl 's theory of the state was In
accordance with the argument of a pragmatist who said:
Some make such a sharp distinction between the
state and a government that, from the standpoint
of theories, a government may be corrupt and the
State by the same Idea retain Its Inherent dignity
and nobility* Officials may be mean, obstinate.
^Qlbld *
.
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proud and stupid and yet the nature of the state
which they serve remain essentially unimpaired.
Since, however, a public Is organized Into a
state through Its government, the state la as Its
officials are. Only through constant watchfulness
and criticism of ptfcllc officials by citizens can
a state be maintained in Integrity and usefulness.
Thus Laskl shared the belief with Mr. Dewey that It la
necessary to criticize public officials In order to pre-
vent the state from being corrupted by Its officials. There
seems to have been strong Influence of John Dewey *s pragma-
tism on Laslcl during the letter »s stay in America. Until
19 26 when he wrote A Qrammar of Politics , the state was to
Laskl not different fundamentally from any other association
(as discussed above). Although he conceded a hl^er moral
claim to the state. It was not a supreme organ to which
every member of society owed unconditional allegiance. On
the contrary. If one felt stronger loyalty to a group to
which he belonged such as church or trade union, he was
Justified In making a decision against the will of the state
As of 1921, when he wrote Authority In the Modern State
Laskl rejected strongly the common will of Dr. Bosanquet,
who Insisted that the common will resided In society apart
from the will of Individual members of society. The Insis-
tence upon the existence of such commcn will was to Laskl
nothlr^ more than "a subtle interpretation of Rousseau *s
^^John Dewey, The Public tind Its Problems (New York:
Henry Holt and Compel5y, pp* 68-66.
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formula*"^^ In hie crltloiem of such argument, Laekl said:
He (Lr. Boeanquet) believes that ultimate power
must reside in the community as a whole; but he
insists that the conception Is meaningless unless
the power finds sane determinate expression. He
places sovereignty, therefore, in the state and
he defines the state as 'the entire hierarchy of
institutions by which life is determined.' Sover-
eignty, in his view, really belongs to the general
will, to the acts, that is to say, of the state's
best self. But this, surely, does no more than
move the inquiry back to a further stage. The state
must find organs for the expressions of its selfhood;
and Dr. Bosanquet gives us no orlterlan by which to
recognize the expression. The sovereignty of the
general will. Indeed, is very likely the assertion
that rlgjit and truth must prevail; but it does
not tell us how certainly to discover the presence
of right and truth.
Laski's concept of the state underwent a rather drastic
revision after 1925, Some of tiie reasons behind his change
in the role of the state were the economic depression in
early 1920s in England which made him realize the necessity
for a stronger central planning and control in economic
activities, the increasing strength of the Labor Party, and
the formation of the MacDonald government in 1931 in the
period of Great Depression, Although, Laski's view on the
role of the State became an almost orthodox one, he still
rejected the notion of General Will, the philosophical
concept of the idealist school on the state.
^^Laskl, Authority in the Modern State , p. 27,
^^Ibid, , pp, 27-28.
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He stllX omin^&lned IHg wiXl of t^e stete Wfts
the will which woe adopted out of the conflict of myriad
will® whloh contend with each other for the maetery of
social forces* Thus he rejected the existence of a single
will of the state which transcends IwSlvldual wills. Hut
after 1926, he admitted the role of the state as a final
source of reference of various contending wills of differ-
ent interest groups. Since the state was an arbitrator
of many conflicting wills, the actions of government should
be carefully scrutinised by the people who were to be In-
fluenced by Its actions. And because the state was repre-
sented by a small group of people who might pervert the
furpose of the state for selfish Interest, the necessity
for scrutinising the actions of government was of great
necessity. This was a point of proof that he still regard-
ed the Individual as finite. Especially when he aald
,
"the
will of the state Is only my will in so far as I freely lend
my judgment to Its en foroement* . .An adequate theory of social
organisation must always begin by recognizing that the Indi-
vidual Is finite. If he Is a member of a herd, he Is also
«26
outside of It and passing judgment upon Its actions,
Laskl was still far from believing In monistic view of state.
^^Laskl, A Grammar of Politics , p. 38.
^^Ibld.. p. 29.
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The extent and the nature of power given to the state
after 1925 was that the state must possess the powers nec-
essary for the accomplishment of the aim of the state. In
A Qrammar of Politics
. Laskl argued that the modern state
was the final legal depository of the social will. It set
the perspective of all other organizations. It brought
within Its power all forms of human activity the control
of which It deemed desirable. It was, moreover, the Im-
plied logic of this supremacy of the state that whatever
remained free of Its control did so by Its permission.,.
Furthermore, the Importance of the state was well expressed
when he stressed that the state was the key-stone of the
social arch, and It moulded the form and substance of the
myriad human lives with whose destinies It was charged.
This view of the state was an evidence of the revision of
mind that he had undergone since the time when Laskl was
an earnest pluralist who saw little distinction between the
state and other forms of associations except the manner of
respective membership. Although the state was still an
association that existed to promote the happiness of people,
the aim of the state seemed to focus upon the enrichment
of common life In egalitarian society. Furthermore, Laskl
gave a new meaning to state when he said that the state
"differs from (other forma of association) in that mcmber-
•
»
26 xbid p. 21,
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ship iB compulBory upon all that live within Ita territor-
ial axQbit, and that it can, in the last resort, enforce its
obligations upon its subjects."^’^ The new role of the state
as discussed in A Qrammar of Politics was Leskl*s admission
of the importance of the state as an organization which
should concern itself with the control over other associa-
tions, particularly economic groups, so that every member
of the society would be assured the minimum well-being
which was necessary to lead a civilized life.
27 Ibid .
.
p. 37
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OH^iPTI'JR III
THE NaIURE op AUTHORITY
&Sl Source of Authority
Laakl opened, the first chapter of Authority In the
Modern State
,
quoting fro® Aristotle, saying, "man Is a
community building animal." Ihe acceptance of tills pro-
position meant that he admitted the necessity of authority
In a given community for the maintenance of its own life.
Since the authority of the state has a direct bearing on
Individual freedom, Laskl devoted much of his attention
In the analysis of authority In the modern state. For him
the Hobbeslan theory of authority which claimed the basis
of authority to be force and fear was not satisfactory to
explain why the mass of people should obey the command of
one or few men. On the other hand, Laskl rejected Rousseau's
formula of General Will. In his opinion, when one was forc-
ed to conform to the common will by outside force, he was
no longer free.^ Moreover, there was no way to know General
Will, If It existed.
For Laskl, the basis upon which the power within a
state resta was the individual conscience; the judgment bas-
ed on Individual conscience affords rights which are beyond
^Laskl, h Grammar of Politics , p. 33
34
control and cannot be denied by the state. Therefore, In
final analysis, the ultimate depository and source of
authority resides in the individual. Thus Laskl says:
Men accept /authority/ either because their own
will finds parts expression there or because,
assuming the goodness of its intention which lies
behind it, they are content, usually, not to re-
sist its imposition. But then law is not a command.
It is merely a rule of convenience. . .Where sovereignty
prevails, where the state acts, it acts by the consent
of men.^
The consent of people, that is to say, the source of authority,
is liable to suspension at any time people think that the
government is not acting for the fulfillment of the purpose
of the state. Therefore, the authority of the state cannot
be absolute. Moreover, the individual member of society has
a duty to scrutinize the actions of government, since he is
himself the source of the authority. Without scrutinizing
the actions of government, he would have no right or knowledge
necessary to protest or to disobey, if it be necessary, the
state.
Laski believed that there was no & priori certainty
that a government would be obeyed. Instead, the posslblli-
ty of anarchy was theoretically at every moment present.
He not only considered that the possibility of anarchy
existed at every moment, but also believed the possibility
^Laskl, Studies in the Problems of Sovereignty , pp.
12-13.
^Laski, author itV in the Modern State , p. 30.
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to be a check on government, and thue an aid In maintaining
a democratic eyetcm. He refuted the legal theory of sov-
ereignty, saying that no man actually surrenders his whole
being to the state
To borrow his words once again:
Whatever the requirements of legal theory, in
actual fact, no man surrenders his whole being
to the state* He has a sense of right and
wrong* If the state, or its instruments, goes
too consistently against that sense, he is
pricked into antagonism* The state, that is to
say, is for him sovereignty only where his con-
science is not stirred against its performance*
Nor is this all* He expects it to make possible
for him the attainment of certain good*®
llierefore, if the state is going to claim the obedience of
people, it must maintain always a higher moral claim than
that of the individuals or other forms of associations* It
also has to provide the people with the necessary informa-
tion concerning the aim and program of the state so that
member of society can have fair opportunities to scrutinise
the actions of the government* Only by achieving the pur-
pose of the state, or by showing to the people that it is
sincerely attempting to achieve it, can the state legitimate-
ly claim the obedience of the people*
What disturbed Laski, in actual fact, was the actions
of government in practice: it was very seldon shown that
^See the Political Theory of Disruption, pp. 27-60*
in Studies In the Problems of Sovereignty *
®Laskl, authority in the Modem State , pp* 42-43*
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a government acted impartially in order to realire indivi-
dual happiness as a whole. On this matter he expressed a
deep lamentation, saying that, "it is today a coimaon place
that the real source of authority in any state is with the
holders of of economic power. The will that is effective is
their will; the commands that are obeyed are their comnands."®
This could well have been the reason, when he was still a
pluralist, why Laski tried so hard to limit the power of
central government, an3 to disperse it as m\j»h as possible
to prevent the misuse of the power by a smell group of people.
The federalized form of government, in which the power was
widely dispersed, seemed to Laski the best form of government
to protect the basic rights of the people. The natural rights
of the people did not emerge with the birth of the modem
nation state, but they preceded it. Even during the medieval
states, there was the conception cf natural rights, that is
to say, the prince had a duty to protect his subjects as well
as to rule.*^ Thus the claim of legal sovereignty, which de-
manded an absolute authority under the name of unity and a
priori concept of the organic nature of the state, seemed
rather incredible to Laski.
In his oplnlcn, the authority of the state ought
®Leskl, The Foundation of Sovereignty , p. 62.
*^
Ibid
. ,
pp. 9-10.
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to be a coordinating one among the different Intercit
groups within a society, rather than a hierarchical one In
which a single will Imposes from above, "Authority Imposed
from wlttiout can never achieve that effect over a period.
Its val\ies are personal to those who make the decisions.
It falls eventually to coordinate the experience affected
by Its decisions. That Is why, moreover, there Is a point
at which the administration of decisions must bo decentral-
ized If It la to be creative."®
Authority and Liberty
Laskl's Insistence upon near absoliite freedom has been
already discussed in his argument for the pluralism. It
should be also recalled that he once seemed to have prefer-
red democracy surrounded ty the possibility of anarchy over
authoritarianism in order not to sacrifice the basic Indi-
vidual freedom. However, since authority Is Ipso facto a
necessity for the malntenoxx^e of oi'der, without which liberty
is Inconceivable, he had to compromise authority and liberty;
or rather, he had to set a limit beyond idilch authority and
liberty could not trespass. In his early writings, Laski
minimized the lmi)ortance of authority because of the fear of
Its encroachment on personal freedom. This could have been
®Laskl, A Grammar of Politics , p. 243
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hl8 natural reaction against the rising totalitarian
philosophy across the Channel.
In 1919 Laski wrote:
A State, after all, is no mysterious entity.
It is only a territorial society into which, from
a variety of historical reasons, a distinction be-
tween rulers and subjects has been introduced.
Ihe only justification for a claim by a government
of its obedience is the clear proof that it sat-
isfies the material and moral claims of tnose over
whom it exercises control...
Oovcrniaent is only a convention which men, on the
whole, accept because of a general conviction that
its effort is for good. Where the machine breaks
down, where the purpose of those «ho drive it be-
comes to an important class sinister, it is humanly
inevitable that an effort towards change should be
made.^
\IVhat he implies here is that we must be always ready to
withdraw our allegiance, if we feel tiriat the government is
not fulfillir^ tiie purpose of the state. Ihe state is en-
titled to the loyalties of the people only by achieving
its aim or by dem cxis trating that it is doing its best to
realize individual happiness. And to judge whether the
governnent is acting according to the purpose of the state
is solely depended upon the individual conscience. By
giving such rights to each individual, a state can be re-
garded to exist for the individual »s freedom and happiness
As strong authority was a great threat to freedom,
to Laski force imposed from without was antithetic to free
^Laskl, Authority in the Modern State , p. 374.
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dom, since it was not desired by the individual. Therefore,
tlie best way to safeguard freedom was to limit the authority
of governiaent* ”lf in any state there is a body of men who
possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule
can never be free.”^® Because, in his belief, "uncontrolled
power is invariably poisonous to those who possess It,"^^
It was the general tendency that the group of people wno
possessed the political power tended to think that what was
good for them was also good for the community as a whole,
Moreover, if this group or person happened to I'epresent the
higher economic interest, as was usually the case, it was
difficult to expect them to sot impartially,
When Laski witnessed a group of people who could not
enjoy freedom due mainly to economic poverty, he realized
that mere abaenoe of restraint was not sufficient for the
self-realization of an individual. He felt some need for
governmental actions in order to bring them out to the
center of social attention again, When he realized the
need for a aoc ial responsibility for the underprivileged
people, Laski undertook a considerable revision as to the
role of government; that is to say, he was compelled to
admit the necessity for a government with some commanding
power to carry out social and economic reforms. However,
^^Leakl, Liberty in the Modern State , p, 2.
^^ Ibid , , p, 2,
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at the same time, he was careful to set a clear line be-
yond which authority should not trespass*
As to individual rights, Laskl*s argument became
somewhat more moderate than when he was an ardent plural-
ist* In A Grammar of Politics * Luskl said in part that,
"there are rules* * *whlch I ought obey even If I disapprove;
for, obviously. If each man is to follow his every impulse
wherever it leads, an organized social life would be im-
possible* It means that force must be used in those
directions only where the common sense of society is on
the side of the type of conduct it seeks to compell*"^^
Thus some limitations upon freedom seemed essential to
promote the happiness of men and to maintain a necessary
order, especially when he said:
1 might not resist if 1 am convinced that the
state is seeking, as best it may, to play its
part; and for most that perception will doubt-
less result from what Inquiry they undertake*
I ought not, further, to resist unless I have
reasonable ground for the belief that the
changes I advocate are likely to result in
the end I have in view; I must, moreover, be
certain that the methods 1 propose to realize
my end will not, in their realization, change
its essential character: men have often enough
sought power for good and ended ty exercising
it for its own soke*^^
By 1926 Laskl come to the conclusion that there must
be a balance between the liberty we need end the authority
^^Laskl, A Grammar of Politics * P* 36*
^^Laski, Ibid ** p. 39*
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that Is essential to maintain an order for the protection
of those who were economically underprivileged. Laskl was
increasingly disturbed over the knowledge that, when every-
body was left alone under the free economic system. It was
almost certain that the society would be divided Into two
classes, otiose respective Interests could not be reconciled
In the long run. The consequence of such a circumstance
was usually the loss of liberty by those who did not have
sufficient economic means. For example, it was difficult
for those who were uneducated due to the lack of financial
means to participate In state affairs freely or to enjoy
full citizenship.
The Problem of Obedience
In consideration of the nature of the state that Laskl
discussed earlier. It becomes rather obvious that the state
has no absolute title to the obedience of the people. Thus
a question arises as to how one should explain or make
legitimate the obedience. Since there exist various conf-
licting wills in a given society, the will of the state
ought to be that one of those wills which proves Itself to
be p?e -eminent and superior in Its utility over the other
wills. The argument that we have to obey the law, since
It Is the ocmmand of the state, does not answer the fund-
amental question, because It returns to the old question
of whether a command of the state is a legitimate one or
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not* Moreover^ to Laskl, law was a rule of convention rather
than the ooromand of the atate^ because^ the origin of law was
not In the s priori assumption of the state, but In the con-
sent of the Individual members of the state. Hence, he
regarded man as a free and responsible moral agent who was
capable of rendering a sound judgnent In most cases. Thus
he argued that "man should do that which he deems morally
right, and that the only obedience he can render Is the
14
obedience consonant with his ethical standard,"
Whether or not the conduct of the government was In
agreement with the elm of the state was for an Individual
to Judge, but not for the agent of the state. If a man
believed that any given act of the government was against
his own will, he not only had a right to refuse obedience
to It, but also had a moral obligation to register his
active dissent from the decisions of authority. Here arises
the question of the validity of Individual Judgment, Of
course, Laskl did not accept the proposition that every
Individual could make a rational Judgment In all occasions.
On the contrary, he assumed that human being was not com-
pletely rational animal, but Laskl seems to have preferred
a state in which a danger may arise from the dissent of an
individual, to the danger of Leviathan state In which a
handful of men have control over tne entire population.
^^Laskl, Authority In the Modem State , p, 206
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La8kl*s extreme Individualistic view of the problem
of obedience was shown well when he stated that, "the
only ground upon which the tndlvldual csn give or be
asked his support for the state is from the conviction
that what it ia aiming at is, in each particular case,
good*** Then he went on to say that, "wo deny*. .that the
general end of the ideal state colours the policy of a
given act of a special state. And that denial involves
from each member of the state continuous scrutiny of its
purpose and its method.
It is of some interest to note Laski's change in his
view on the problem of obedience. By 1926, when he wrote
A Orammor of folitios . he seems to have begun to realize
the importance of maintaining a greater degree of social
ozxSer in order to achieve the aim of the state. It should
be remembered that the year 1924 was the time when the
Labor Party came into power for the first time in its his-
tory. Prom a practical viewpoint, if any social reforms
were to be opposed, as may have well been expected, by the
minority opposition party, it would lead to great difficulty
in realizing the aim at the state as envisaged by the Labor
Party, even if it were supported by the majority of the
people. But there is no reason why Laski’s argument for
disobedience should not be applied to an opposition party
^^Ibid.
,
p* 46.
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that does not agree with the Labor programs, in order to
meet this difficulty, he revised his earlier view on the
problem of obedience after 1925, It is not surprising, how*
ever, to see the modification he made on the problem, since
he wasa theorist who always tried to theorize in terms of
practical politics* For this reason he has been accused
of being inconsistent in his argument, but it should not
be assumed that he completely abandoned the individualistic
view on the matter of individual rights. It was rather his
attempt to compromise the individual claim with that of
authority. For instance, Laski still argued In A Grammar
of Politics as follows*.
Our obligation to obey the state is, law apart,
an obligation dependent upon the degree to which
the state achieves Its purpose* We are the
judges of that achievement* • *We must obey the
state, not because its theoretic purpose is a
splendid one, but because of our conviction
that it is genuinely asking to make that pur*
pose valid in events*^®
But in the same book, he seems to emphasize the human
being as a community building animal, by emphasizing this
aspect of hum«n nature, Laski tried to make legitimate a
certain degree of authority* Thus in a modern state, in
his view, "spontanlety ceases to be practical, and the
enforced acceptance of a common way of action becomes the
necessary condition of a corporate civilization*”^'^ i*urther,
^^Laskl, A Grammar of Politics , pp. 26-27.
17 Ibid *, p* 18
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he went on to say that the rlgjtit of die obedience la "rea-
sonably to be exercised only at the margins of political
conduct* Mo community could hope to fulfill its purpose
if rebellion becotosa a settled habit of the population*"^®
This argument was a considerable revision of his
earlier view «^loh said that the state was surrounded by
the possibility of anarchy* /.'hen Laakl adopted the view
of near-aarxlan socialism, after experiencing the depres-
sion of 1929 and the defection of the Maolonald government,
his theory of disobedience seems to have returned to the
earlier view which stressed the right of cisobedlence,
but the disobedience of the Individual seems to have been
replaced by that of a class* The further discussion of
this point will bo postponed to chapter five, which will
deal with the political Ideas of Laskl as a socialist*
^Qlbld* , p* 61
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CHAPTER IV
LIBERTY AND E^tUAUTY
La»ki*8 Concept of Liberty
A discus Bl on of liberty occupied one of the most Im-
portant pieces in the writings of Professor Lsskl; his
discussion of its meaning as well as the social and eeon-
mlc conditions in which liberty could be best realized
was rather extensive and thorough in his writings. Like
many argisnents he developed in his early writings
,
the
core of La8kl*B arguments on liberty were primarily direct-
ed against Hegelian idealism. Thus Laski asked whether
freedom meant, as Hegel meant, to live the life that
authority ordains, or whether it meant the reco^iition
that there were certain reserves within the individual
mind about which ultimate resistance must be organized.
In order to understand Laski 's position on liberty, it
would be useful to see some aspects of the Hegelian con-
ception of it.
Freedom in the Hegelian sense is more or less a
conformity with the law and custom as Interpreted ty the
ethical spirit of the particular society to which the
individuals belong.^ A critical analysis of the Hegelian
^L. T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the btate,
(London: George Allen 4: Unwin Ltd. , ISIS) » P*
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concept would provide ue with the starting point for
understanding Laslcl's conception of freedom. Dr. Bosanquet,
a faithful disciple of Hegel, described Liberty as follows
In the first decade of the twentieth century:
Liberty, no doubt. Is as Rousseaihas told
us, so far agreeing with Mill, the essential quality
of human life. It Is so, we understood, because It
Is the condition of our being ourselves. But now
that It has occurred to us that in order to be
ourselves we must be always becoming something
which we are not. In other words, we must always
recognize that we are something more than we have
become, liberty, as the condition of our being
ourselves, cannot simply be something which we have,
still less something we have always had -- a status
quo to be maintained. It must be a condition re-
levant to our continued struggle to assert the control
of something In Us, which we recognize as Imperative
upon us or as our real self, tut which we obey in a
very imperfect degree. Thus It is that we can speak^
without a contradiction, of being forced to be tree*
In Hegelian sense, free will is the will which determines
Itself; It forms a raticnal iihole or system of conduct in
idilch individual will has to play certain predetermined roles
for the rational whole. This means that every member of
society must act according to the prescribed law and custom
of society in order to be free. It is not for each Individual
to judge whether the law or customs are against the individual
conscience. This was another aspect of the conservative
nature of Hegelian philosophy. It la true that a society
will end up in total anarchy, if liberty is understood as
mere absence of restraint and if people act accordingly, but
^Ibid
. , pp. 126-27
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't}i6 1*6 Is no jus^lfl ostlon for Hogelians to sssuins that tho
liberty is equivalent to the oommand of state.
In rejecting Hegel's thesis that freedom was conformity
to law and custon, Laski refused to accept the feasibility
of discovering in the social worlds laws analogous in ohar-
aoter to those of inanimate nature.
The attempt /to discover such laws in the
social world as those that are found in the phy-
sical world/ is impossible. It neglects the fact
that the social world is not only permanently dy-
namic but also pexmanently novel; the factors in
its equations are the active wills of individual
men who, by scrutinizing the contingent results,
are in a position to change them. They make change
by willing charge. Laws, therefore, which have the
tough consistency of natural laws, those, for example,
of physios and chemistry, are impossible of attain-
ment in the political realm. A social life according
to nature, as art is man's nature; and a life accord-
ing to the higieat principle of art depends upon a
view of beauty or goodness which can claim universal
application.^
Thus Laski was much in line with traditional liberalism with
a deep commitment to social engineering for the betterment
of individual happiness and the Increase of individual free-
dom.
Individual freedom based upon one's own conscience was
the center of his argument. He maintained, until he realized
that individual freedom had little meaning without the social
and economic means to realize it, that “the only permanent
^Laskl, an Introduction to Politics (London, George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., , p* fes*
“*Ibid.
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safeguard of democratlo government is that the unchanging
and ultimate sanction of Intellectual decision should be
the (Individual) conscience.**^ It was the realm within
which even the state cannot, as well as should not, have
right to interfere. On this matter he argued as follows:
We thus Insist. .. that the mind of each man...
pass judgment upon the state; and we ask for his
condemnation of its policy where he feels It In
conflict with the right. That, surely. Is the only-
envlronment In which the plant of liberty can flour-
ish. It implies. . .insistence that the allegiance
of man to the state is secondary to his allegiance
to what he may conceive his duty to society as a
who le ....
In ordinary acceptance of the term, such an attitude
denies the validity of any sovereign power save that
of the right: and it urges that the discovery of
right is, on all fundamental questions, a search,
upon which the separate members of the state must
individually engage.^
This argument was an integral part of Laski's pluralism. He
believed that individual freedom could be maximized in a
society where the power of the state was highly decentraliz-
ed.
Liberty as an individual initiative and continuous
creative activities for the mess of people was difficult to
realize in the monistic state except for those few who were
economically privileged. His belief that the real freedom
could not be realized in the monistic state as well as under
^Laski, Authority in the Modern State , p. 55.
^Ibid. , pp. 121-22.
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the lalse*-falre syatem led him to accept the positive free-
dom of Thomas H. Oreen# Although Oreen was known as the
British neo-Hegelian^ It should not be neglected that he was
also Influential, as the founder of the Oxford liberal move-
ment, in the movement of Pablan Socialism In England, it
was from Oreen, Laskl adopted his definition of positive
freedom. He supplemented It by, at the same time, accept-
ing Lord Acton’s axiom in order to safeguard the right of
the Individual claim based upon one’s own conscience,'^ by
positive freedom in Green’s sense. It Is meant that the
state should see that each member of society is provided
with adequate conditions In developing oneself to the full-
est degree,
(iuotlng from Green and Acton, Laskl said:
’When we speak of freedom as something to be
highly prised’, said T. H. Green, *we mean a posi-
tive power of doing or enjoying /something worth
doing or enjoying/ end that, too, something that
we do or enjoy in common with others.' That Is
more valuable than the negative conception because
It Insists on what. In this age, we feel to be
fundamental In liberty -- the power of adding
sanethlng to the quality of the common life. But
it does not, of coux se — though Green had else-
whei^ answered that question — tell us what It
Is worthwhile to do or enjoy; and here again,
acute difference of opinion Is possible. It was
as a historian that Acton approached the problem,
and hla answer had a connotation not to be nls-
understood. ’By liberty’, i:i® said, ’I mean the
assuraivse that every man will be protected In
^Friedrich A. flayek thought Lord Acton had represented
the true Individualism In the nineteenth century alo^ with
Alexis de Tooquevllle; see Hayek, Individual am and Economix
Order. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948 ;, p.
4.
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doing what he believes hla duty against the in-
fluence of authority, custom, and opinion.
Laskl*s acceptance of Green's definition of freedom,
which tolerates a greater degree of governmental authority
for the promotion of common good, seems to be in contra-
diction with his argument for the Individual right which
can even defy the authority of state, if one's conscience
tells him to resist. But, by introducing Acton's defini-
tion of freedom, Laski attenpted to preserve his original
position of safeguarding the right of individual. By em-
ploying both terms, Laski was able to resort to the defini-
tion of Acton when he wished to defend the individual rights;
and to that of Green when he was fighting for the interest
of the social and ec anomic under-dog.
The focus of his discussion of liberty rests upon the
fact that, in the capitalistic society, the opportunities
for a creative self-expression were enjoyed only by those
vdio possess economic power. His egalitarian philosophy
did not allow him to be contented with such social injus-
tice. Warning not to confuse the absence of restraint in
the economic sphere with freedom, Laski said, "there may
be absence of restraint in the economic sphere, for example,
in the sense that a man may be free to enter any vocation
he may choose. Yet if he is deprived of security in em-
®Laskl, Authority in the Modern btate , p. 56.
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ployment he becomes the prey of mental end physical servi-
tude Incompatible with the very essence of liberty.**® That,
could have been the reason why, In spite of his great em-
phasis on the value of the Individual he accepted Green's
definition of positive freedom, which acknowledged the role
of government to set a minimum standard below which no mem-
ber of the society should fall. Such a remark as 'to compel
obedience to rules of convenience which promote rl^t living
Is not to make a man unfree' has been regarded by some as
fundamentally not different from Hegelian conception of
freedom which Insisted that Individual had to be forced to
be free. But, under a closer scrutiny. It should be noted
that the rule of convenience Laskl had In mind was rather a
broad norm of social conduct derived from the experience of
the Individual members of society. It was, moreover, quite
distinct from Hegel's ethical spirit idilch transcends In-
dividual experience and, therefore, beyond the reach of
scrutiny by the knowledge and conscience of the Individual.
Although Laskl did not define the Individual right
clearly, he ssld ti»t the Individual right was something
the pragmatist would understand. By stating that the
Individual right was something the Individual ought to
concede because experience had proved It to be good,^^
®Laskl, Liberty In the Modern State , p. 4.
^^Laskl, Studies In the Problems of Sovereignty, p. 18.
V.
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Laskl gave relative value to the rl^t as the aouroe of
individual freedom.
Economic Equality and Liberty
As discussed above
»
the primary reason for Laski^s
acceptance of positive freedom seems to be his belief that
without a certain economic basis liberty becomes almost
meaningless for those who have to exhaust themselves in
acquiring their dally bread* Thus equality, especially in
the economic sense, becomes an important condition for
realizing freedom; to Laski, freedom and equality are not
antithetic but complement aiy to each other* To Laski,
therefore, the mitigation of inequality was a path to
freedom*
In Laski *8 opinion, capitalistic democracy lacked
the necessary conditions of realizing freedom, due to its
inherent nature of inequality* Laski argued that men can-
not achieve freedom when a few citizens enjoy special pri-
vilege, or when the right of some depends upon the pleasure
of others, or when ths incidence of the power of the state
was biased in favor of one group* For him the absence
of special privilege, adequate opportunities for individual
initiative, and the minimum guarantee of economic well
being sufficient to enjoy a civilized life were the essen-
^^Leane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski ,
pp* 106-9*
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tlal conditions of liberty. Such a belief led him closer
tavaz^ the orthodox Marxism after 1930, and more about
him as socialist will be discussed in the following chap-
ter.
In his argument for the complementary nature of liberty
and equality, Laski argued as follows:
It (liberty) means the guarantee of avenues
through s4iich that Initiative may find its way to
its appointed end. Obviously, therefore, liberty
is Inseparable from equality, since the a priori
distinction which announces differences of access
restricts the chance of liberty to a few fortunate-
ly situated persons in the state. A society in
which men are given an equal opportunity of self-
realizati^ is, also* a society in which there is
justice.^*
Certainly, then, equality as an equal opportunity for self-
realization does not contradict the idea of freedom. Laski
denied an equality meaning an identity of treatment, but he
meant that each individual had a equal right to claim his
happiness.
It was after 1920, when he returned from America, that
t
Laski began to pay grave attention to the importance of
econondos. It was the time when the post-World War I boom
gave way to a depression, and the number of unemployed was
lncz*easing with alaz*iriing rapidity. Such a situation, in
which the mass of people devoted their energy to acquiring
daily bread, convinced Laski that economic insecurity was
antithetic to the realization of freedom. It also convinced
^^Laski, A Grammar of Politics , p. 273.
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him that certain political action was necessary to solve
such economic problems. Thus he came to regard It as a
positive duty of the state to secure for its members a
certain minimum standard of economic life, possibly through
the means of a planned economy.
Although a certain degree of economic equality was
necessary for freedom, as discussed above, equality and
freedcm were not the same thing to Laski. People can be
equal under a despotic rule without enjoying any freedom;
equality does not necessarily produce freedom. But freedom
requires a certain degree of economic equality. Thus he
argued that, "we are in the difficulty that every step we
take towards freedom is a step towards the equalization of
privileges now held uncquelly." and he went on to say
that, "the penumbra of freedom. Its purpose and its life,
is the movement for equal!ty*"^^ Laski believed that
eoonomio equality provided the necessary conditions for
people to be free.
Liberty Involves equality; the two are not
antithetic; liberty only begins to operate signi-
ficantly upon the plane of equality; without the
it Is but a name of noble sound end squalid re-
sult, for equality supplies the basis out of which
liberty comes to have a positive meaning, all
are therefore equally entitled to those rights
which are necessary to the leading of the good
life; these rights are natural, preclsejg be-
cause they are its necessary condition.
l^Laskl, D^^mocracv in Crisis (Chapel HIU, North Carolina:
The University of North Carolina Press, 19o3) , p.
215.
^^ Ibld . , pp. 216-17.
^^Viuoted In, Roger H.
tlcal Sclerwe," Poll tic
a
koltau. “Professor Laski and
larterly . XXI (July 1950), p. 304.
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The aim of the state to realize Individual freedom la
the positive role of the government in providing equal
opportunities to the citizen* For example^ compulsory edu*
cation Is not in this sense against the spirit of liberty,
because, "an illiterate man has no real means of performing
ttie functions of citizenship."^® Also, "it Is no use offer-
ing a man freedom of speech unless he has been trained to
articulate. Furthermore, those who are physically and
mentally exhausted in the sheer effort to acquire dally
bread have little opportunities for freedom. Thus the
government should see that nq member of the society Is de-
prived from enjoying the freedom due to economic reason.
Laskl's concept of freedom underwent a serious modifi-
cation In the late twenties. His early Insistence on posi-
tive freedom may appear to have given way to the utilitarian
view of liberty as a mere absence of restraint. For example.
In the preface to the second edition of A Grammar of folltloa
published in 1929, Laskl said In part, "In 1925 I thought
that liberty could most usefully be regarded as more than
a negative thing. I am now convinced that this was a mis-
take, end the old view of It as an absence of restraint can
alone safeguard the personality of citizen."
The reason shy he took a seemingly negative concept of
^®Laski, Authority In the Aiodern State , p. 47.
^"^Laskl, Democracy In Crisis , p. 207.
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freedom is a question that requires careful study. It may
strange that Laski^ w^o inclined closely towards
orthodox Marxism (which advocates a positive role of the
state at least in the early stt^e of control of the state)
»
had taken the position of believing the absence of restraint
as freedom. Perhaps Laskl took the position of negative
freedom realizing that the kind of egalitarian society he
wished had proved to be too difficult to bring about due to
the opposition of the vested interests who were in control
of the state apparatus.
In closer scrutiny > it would be found that the negative
freedcm position he took at this period was different from
negative freedom in a Utilitarian sense. He said in the
opening page of Liberty in the Modern State , ”l mean by
liberty the absence of restraint upon the existence of those
social conditions which^ in modern civilization, are the
Ills
necessary guarantees of individual happiness.
Here it should be noted that the absence of restraint
did not apply to individual action, but to those social
conditions which were necessary for individual happiness*
Thus it was in agree msnt with his earlier view namely that
freedom was the system of conditions that enables the in-
dividual to attain self-realization. The attempt to bring
about such social conditions should not be obstructed by
^^Laski, Liberty in the Modern State , p, 1
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the authority of a hostile government. Laski may have
meant that there should not be ony outside restraint if
the working class should attempt to set up an egalitarian
society. Also such a measure as compulsory education was
not contradictory to his argisnent which said that liberty
was an absence of restraint up>on the necessary social con*
ditions, since such a measure was to get rid of illiteracy
in order to bring about the necessary social condition
(where everybody was highly informed and able to express
his view on daily political occurences). Thus he could
say without contradiction that^ "a compulsory training of
mind is still compulsion. It is a sacrifice of sons liber-
ty to a greater freedom when the compulsion ceases. In
view of such an argument » it could be justly said that he
was not far away from his earlier position when he advocated
positive freedom.
However, as he leaned closer towards Marxian socialism,
he reasoned that the state in the capitalistic society was
perverted for the interests of a specific group, and he
was, more or less, logically compelled to employ the con-
cept of negative freedom to denounce the attempt of the
privileged class to oppose any major social reform, or
^
^Ibid ., p. 6. -
1919 Laski rejected this idea saying that to argue
that a government was perverted to the ends of any class
within 8 state was, *to project into history a malignant
teleology from which it is, in no small degree, free.*
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their opposition to alter the basic legal and social struc-
ture* The change In his conception of freedom could be more
readily understood in connection with his transition towards
Marxism* Therefore, I would like to d isouss briefly why he
gradually adopted the socialistic view to preserve and main-
tain freedom and equality* Further discussion of Laski as
a socialist will be devoted to the following chapter*
Laski expressed his view that a society divided Into a
small number of rich and a large number of poor persona was
not adequate for the self-realization of the individual*
Where society Is divloed between the exploiters and exploit-
ed, there cannot be a genuine democratic government, because
the real meaning of the democratic government is the equal
weighing of Individual claims to happiness ty social insti-
tutions*^^ Tlius he presumed that democracy cannot exist in
a capitalistic society which denies economic equality* In
a capitalistic society, there Is a class with the power to
use the authority of the state for its Interests* Such a
society Is a house divided and, in Laskl*8 words:
a wealthy class strives, inevitably, to pro-
tect Its advantages at their maximum; and the poor
are driven to attempt their invasion as the only
way of enjoying their results* The state, there-
fore, Is compelled. If it seeks to realize Its ends,
so to organize Its activities as deliberately as
mitigate the consequences of this material Inequal-
1 ty * * * *
For every improvement in eoucation, or health, or
^^Laski, Liberty In the Modem State , pp* 217, 228-29
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housing among tins poor leads to an increased In-tensity of demand for further concession a. They
realize the inadequacy of a social system whichdoes not relate proportionately the toll md the
gain of living. The passion for equality, in a
word, is a permanent feature of human nature.^”
By 1930 Laski conceded the practical difficulty of the
near absolute freedom shich he so ardently advocated at the
time »4ien he was a pluralist. By this time, also, he admit-
ted the necessity to compromise freedom to authority in order
to reach a certain balance between the two. Thus, about the
limit on freedom, Laski argued as follows:
We cannot, however, say that the right to
these freedoms is unlimited. The state must,
because its business is the preservation of
order, concern itself to see that the peace is
maintained. It is, therefore, entitled to say
that any utterance which directly incites to
immediate disorder is subject to penalty; and
that any association which embarks upon action
likely to threaten the maintenance of order shall,
also, be subject to penalty
Thus individual freedom must be limited when ti:e re is an
imminent threat to the social order. However, too many
times the limitation of freedom has been employed for the
preservation of the unequal social order. Although Laski
was very unhappy about this fact, once he saw the possi-
bility for the victory of the British Labor Party, he argued:
It /the British Labor Party/ is concerned,
if it can, to implement the socialist principles
for which it stands by the procedures of demo-
cratic consent; but granted that it receives the
^^Laskl, An Introduction to Politics , pp. 32-3.'
^^Ibid #. pp. 39-40.
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authority of the electorate for Its programme.
It cannot allow the dissent of a minority, how-
ever vociferous and powerfyl, to stand in the
way of its achievement,
.
Such an argument as this runs quite contrary to his earlier
argument for the right of dissent If Individual conscience
tells him to do so. Partisan sentiment seems to have cloud-
ed the scholarly objectivity of Laski, Laski*s position
could be defended, if one insists that his early argument for
individual right was directed toward the theory of the Levi-
athan state rising across the Channel, and that the argument
quoted above -- was motivated from his sincere conviction
that programs put out by the Labor Party were the path to
freedom and equality. But it is difficult to deny that
Laski became rather dogmatic in his belief. It is highly
regrettable that Laski took such an attitude, since he was
the one who always warned us not to be d qgmatic in the field
of political belief.
It could also be assumed that the abandoniiient of his
pluralism in 1930s end the adoption of Marxian socialism
marked a new phase in Laski's political ideas. Of course,
it is true that he became more dogmatic in his view of
history^ but he never completely abandoned the liberal
sentiment of his earlier thinking, and this distinguished
Laski from other more doctrinaire Marxists,
2*fiaroie J. Iha StraUgy of Freedom (Harper
& Brothers Publishers, New York: 1941), p. 110*
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CHiiPTIiR V
SOCIi^LISM OJ' U6K.1
V/hen Luski was beginning his study at Oxford, he was
already a member of the B’ablan Society. But he was at tnat
time. It Is said, at least as rnuoh a liberal as a socialist.^
It should be also mentioned that Laskl at this period did not
play any prominent or conspicuous role as a socialist. He
was more moderate than militant In his political opinions.
Looking back In 1959, Laskl affirmed that he became a social-
ist partly due to the Influence of a great school master,
Mr. Pet an, and "something, too, was the outcome of a Jewish
upbringing, the sense It conferred of being treated dlffer-
_2
ently from other people end no obviously assignable cause."*'
but the most Important reason for his having become a social-
ist seems to be the strong sense cf the Injustice he saw In
his contemporary world; "up to 1920, I think, as I look back,
that my socialism was above all the outcome of a sense of
injustice of things as they were... ."
Throughout his writings, he has a3>’eys been proud of
being a socialist. His Idealism never dimmed throughout
his life. Sometimes he was discouraged and other times he
seemed to have fallen into a deep sense of despair. But he
^Martin, op . olt .
,
p. 15.
^Laskl, "Why I am a Marxist," Natl on^ V. 148, p. 59.
^Ibld.
,
p. 6 0.
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never comproul aed what he believed to be Juatlce under any
olroumstance*
Laekl, In a broad sonae, accepted the dialectical
materlallam of Mar:}il8m* It seems rather ironic that Laakl
took the dialectical materlallam of Marx, which was essen-
tially based on Hegel’s phi lose fhy which Laski hud been
refuting with his utmost efforts* The dialectical method
had some advantage over the traditional method in explaining
the d evcloiJMsnt of history* According to Engels, the tradi-
tional method dealt with the natural objects in Isolation
and repose, while the dialectical method comprehended things
in their essential oonneotion, conoaternati on, and motion*^
Laski seems to have employed this method in explaining past
history as demonstrated in one of his books, namely The Rise
of Liberalise *
The attempt to explain past ld.story based on this view
manifested itself as an economic interpretation of history*
According to this view, there are two basic factors in the
economic condition of any society which characterize the econ-
omic structure of this society. The two basic factors are
(1) the material forces of production and (2) the knowledge
nooessaxy to utilise ttie material forces of production. The
conditions of production give rise to certain relations of
production in order to utilize these conditions of production
^Frederick Engels, Socialism Utopi^i and Scientific
(Loiidon. Ueorge Allen ic Unw in, 19l>0) , pp* oi-<t4*
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efficiently. The relatione of production depend upon the
oonditioKks of product Ion y that le to eay^ liie relations of
production in a oapitalletic eoclety, such ts legal, poli-
tical
,
educat ic»nal, and religious institutions, are a
mere superstructure of the conditions of production.
At certain stages of econojalc developrnent, according
to ifiarxiam, the material forces of production oorao into
conflict with relations of production; the forces of pro-
duction outgrow the relations of production. Such contra-
diction is the inherent attributes of a capitalistic system
according to Marxism. This contradiction stems from the
fact that, in the oapitallstie economic system, the modes
of production are socialized In a sense that they are used
by a society as a whole for the purpose of production, while
they a re in practice owned by individual oopltallsta. Only
a violent means of revolution can bring a new harmony between
the out Jointed conditions of prod’.2Ctlon and the relations
of productlcn, since those who own the means of production
never voluntarily abdicate their privileges.
Leski accepted this concept of the economic interpreta-
tion of history in a broad sense, thereby attempting to ex-
plain til e development of history based on the economic
conditions of a given time. For example, "he saw the rise
of liberalism in Europe as a result of the Reformation and
the , econanlc and subsequently political, of
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t>ouz*g6ol slo • book vcFlbbon In bfail.8 mannox* la Tho Rla#
of Llberaliam as mentioned briefly above.
On the subject of historioal meterlallam, Laakl felt
that the Marxian philosophy of history was the Insistence
that the primary motive force which caused social changes
was the system of economic production. All the other forms
of effort would adjust themselves to the economic needs,
whether consciously or unconsciously. In accepting this
view in a broad sense, Laskl Interpreted historical mater-
ialism as followsi
Nor does it /economic interpretation of history/ in-
sist that economic conditions are the sole cause of
change; it merely argues that they are its main
cause. Roughly speaking, it is an argument to the
effect that man's situation is the preceptor of
his duty, and that in that situation economic ele-
ments are paramount simply because the means of
life are the first thing to which men must pay
attention.”
Here, one example of Laski's attempt to soften the Marxist
dogma could be noticed. In Communism. Laski warned against
a dogmatic attempt which tried to interpret all historical
development based solely upon economic conditions saying,
**the communist reliance upon a kind of natural law in social
revolution leads him seriously to underestimate the power of
®K. Callard, "The Heart and Mind of Harold Laskl",
The Canad ian Journal of Economics and Political Science , XX
No. ^ rSay 1954), p. ^4V.
^Laskif Communism , New York, 1927, p. 77.'
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forces which are of a non-econondc Then he went on
to argue that:
The degree to which nationalism, for Instance,
will resist economic necessity is remarkable* • • •
An Jinglish working-man ought, doubtless, to feel
that he has more in common with the French or
German worker than with the Kngllsh capitalist*
The fact remains that, in general, he gives no
sign of such feeling*”
Although Las Id. did not accept the economic interpreta-
tion of history literally, he acknowledged the Importance of
economic relations on the other social institutions, espec-
ially on the nature of government, as shown when he said,
"there is no department of human life in which the governing
ideas and Institutions will not be found, upon examination,
to be largely a reflection of a given set of economic condi-
tions*"® By 1931 Laski leaned more closely towards the
orthodox theory of Marxism, and held the view that the char-
acter of any particular state would be determined by the
ec^omic system* In a society where extreme economic in-
equality prevails, those who control the economic power
would command the legal systems for their own class interests*
The state, in such circumstances, would not act to promote
the general well-being of a community, but for the interests
*^lbid * , p. 88*
Qlbld ** pp* 88 ff*
^Ibld* t p* 78*
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of the dominant economic group. Here hia early insistence
that the government ia not consciously perverted to the
ends of any class, end that so to argue is to project into
history a malignant teleology from which it is, in no small
10degree free, has been greatly modified.
Along with historical materialism, Marx developed the
theory of surplus value in order to explain the phenomenon
of exploitation in a capitalistic system. Marx asserted
that the socially necessary labor power embodied in com-
modities was the sole determinant of their value. The surplus
value was the difference between what workers receive in order
to subsist and what is totally derived from what they have
created. Thus Marx contented that the workers actually
created more value than they were paid. Marx further reduced
capital as the product of past labor, and asserted that work-
ers alone produce all the values.
Laski did not accept this theory of surplus value as
being valid as theory:
I do not myself believe that the Marxian theory of
value has, despite all the refinements of its ad-
vocates, stood the test of time. It was in its day
a fair answer to the Ricardian school; but with the
progress of economic doctrine its rehabilitation is
no longer seriously possible. But it is v/orthwhlle
to note that its theoretic inadequacies neither
stood, nor are likely to sUnd, in the way of its
acceptance by most of those who feel bitterly and
suffer from the inadequacies of our present economic
10See above, p. 56.
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arrangement
•
Thus, although Laskl did not take the theory of eurplut
value too seriously In a theoretical sense, he accorded
much credit to It In the sense that **liarx'8 theory of value
appeals to {the poor) as a simple and direct explanation of
his distressed condition..# He did not underestimate
the propaganda value of the theory.
It was also the contention of Marx that as long as the
Institution of private property remained, the surplus value
would be pocketed by the bourgeois class, and the class
struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would
be Inevitable. Further Marx asserted that as the capital-
ist system developed further, the wealth would be concentrat-
ed Into the hands of fewer rich, and the misery of the poor
would be Intensified. Then the proletariat would grow class
conscious and It would. In the end, over-throw the capitalist
system by violent means, because the bourgeois class would
not abdicate their privileges voluntarily.
Laskl also viewed the history of capitalism as the
history of a relentless defense of each phase of the rights
of property; they were always defended without regard to
Justice. He thou^t that there might be periods of conces-
sion by the bourgeois class, as In an epoch of expanding
^^Laskl, "Marxism after Fifty Years", Current History ,
XXXVIl, (March 1933), p. 692.
^^Ibld.
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tr&de, but onoe any vital point was affected by the workers'
demands, they were met, as in the French Kevolution, by armed
resistance
Laski saw the rise of fascism in this light; when the
foundation of capitalism was tnreatened by the demands of
workers, and when the oapitel ists were unable to make major
economic concessions in a time of economic contraction, they
turned to the outlaws to defend their economic privileges:
The essence of fascism, whether in its German or
its Italian form, is the use of the outlaw by
the privileged to defend themselves against the
demand of the masses for justice* That demand
is made when the contraction of the economic system
brings out the innerent contradiction between the
forces of production and its relations *^^
Hence, he argued during World War II, unless capitalism was
transformed to a socialistic economic order, "we shall find
ourselves confronted by the precieely the same grim issues
about which we are fitting today ***^® This argument of
Laski seems to be an- over*simplifi cation of the causes which
contributed to the rise of fascism; he seems to have under-
estimated such factors as the traditional Prussian militarism,
the evil genius erf* Hitler, the influence of Romanticism which
fermented such a fanatic nationalism in Germany, and the
effect of the Peace of Versailles, along with the threat of
^^ Ibid , , p. 693.
^^Laskl, "Revolution by Consent", Nation , V. 167,
(September lb, 1943), p. 349*
^^Ibid.
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communism, wtolch all contributed to the rise of fascism*
In his arg\mient, Laski also seems to have neglected the
flexibilities of a free society, which could adjust it-
self to the changing demands of time; he overlooked the
possibility of that the capitalistic society could take
mere responsibility for the social end economic welfare
of its members within the framework of a free and democrat-
ic political system*
Although Laski himself wished to see the basic reform
brought about by peaceful means, he was always skeptical
about the possibility of those property holders making a
major concession voluntarily, and he constantly warned of
the outbreak of revolution unless serious popular grievances
were remedied by legal means* Laski realized the difficulty
and said once; **1 have been arguing that, when the poli-
tical democracy seeks to transfer (the instruments of
production) to the community, the capitalist class will,
if it can, use the state power to supress democratic insti-
tutions*"^^ So he implied that a violent revolution might
be inevitable*
La ski's attitude was understood and reported by some
of the conservative papers in England as one advocating a
violent revolution* This resulted in the famous Libel Case
brought by Laski against the Newark Advertiser and South
^^Laskl, The State in Theory and Practice , p. 123
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Notts gazette In 1946. Laekl lost the case despite hit
gallant defense that what he was insisting on was^ *wlth
the end of war, if the reform were not brought about by
constitutional means, there was danger of drifting toward
violence and revolution
Lastcl was against the use of violent means towards
social reform, because, along with many other reasons, such
a violent upheaval did not necessarily contain an a priori
assurance that it would produce an Idyllic society as envis-
aged by Marx. According to La ski:
Violence on the grand scale. In fact, so far from
providing an avenue to communism, would be the one
kind of existence In which t^ impulse demanded by
a communist society would have no hope of emergence.
For the condition of communism Is the restraint of
exactly those appetites which violence releases; and
the coramunlBt had nowhere shown how this difficulty
can be met except by affirming ^at dictatorship will
destroy thera.^®
Laskl expressed a deep skepticism concerning the over-
simplified Marxian dogma which contended that, after the
proletariat revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat
would be followed l?y a classless society. Laskl argued
that there was a great over -simplification of the historical
process In Marxism; "the struggle for Justice Is not ended
by the creation of a classless society. Nor will the observer
be tempted to admit. If he can maintain some measure of ob-
^’^"Laskl Libel Case", Nation . V. 163 (December 21,
1946), p. 714.
18
Laskl, Communism , p. 174.
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Jectlvity, that the victory of the proletariat is any
more certain than the victory of men like Napoleon or
19Mueeollni*** •* Laaki'a disagreement with Marx on this
subject was conspicuous when Laskl said that:
Nor is it easy to see why Marx* view of the commun-
ist state should be accepted. If the revolution he
foresaw became universal
^
there is no inherent rea-
son why the result should be the kind of society he
desired. «• • While economic classes might
,
by hypo-
thesis, disappear, another form of class rule, that
of doctrinal aristocracy, for example, might take
its place. The poison of power is notorious, and
it is difficult to see why communists should be
held Immune from its toxins. 20
Unlike Marx, Laski did not exclude the possibility of
compromise between the two classes, although he admitted
that the chances for such a compromise were extremely slim.
Laski acknowledged the possibility of some alternatives to
the violent revolution, namely a revolution by consent.
This very attitude distinguished him from the deterministic
dogma of orthodox Mancism. Laskl*6 insistence on revolution
by consent was an argument much qualified when it was to
be applied In practice: it was his firm belief that the
peaceful change of the fundamental political and economic
institutions was of utmost difficulty in its nature, and if
it is possible, it would be carried out most likely in a
state like i*ngla nd where the people had been accustomed to
^^Laskl, **Marxism after Fifty Years,**, p. 695.
^^Laskl, Communism , p. 66.
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the representative Institutlone for a long period of time,
and Ythere there had been also a long period of liberal
tradition*
On the nature of the state, Laskl'a view waa similar
to that of Marx, who believed that the state In a capital-
istic society was an organ whose pxlmex^ purpose wes to
suppress and exploit economically weak ones. Such a state
aimed at the creation and maintenance of an order In order
to legalize and enable economic exploitation. In Laskl's
opinion,
what occurs In any state where there are great
material differences between classes Is simply
a perversion of the end of the state to the
Interests of the rich. Their power oompells
the agents of the state to make their wishes
the first object of consideration. Their con-
ception of good insensibly pervades the mental
climate of administration. They dominate the
machinery of the state. By justice they mean
the satisfaction of their demands, by lessons
of history tlicy mean the deposit of their ex-
perience...
Than Laskl went on to argua that the Greek city-state
was biased against slaves, the Koman empire against the slave
and the poor. States In the medieval world were biased In
favor of the owners of landed property. Since the industrial
revolution, the state has been biased in ^avor of the owners
of the Instruments of production as against those who have
nothing tut their labor power to aell.^^ Then he proceeded
^^Laskl, Ln Introduction to Politics , pp. 43-44.
Laskl, The btate In Theory and Practice , p. 87.
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to concluJ e that the state could never be neutral in any
society where there were class distinctions. In Lsald-'a
opinion, the state was merely a coercive power used to
protect the system of rights and duties of one process of
economic relationship from invasion by another class
karxlan philosophy is dominated by a deep rooted his-
toric let attitude combined with a rigid determinism. There-
fore it is not strange that Laski, whose approach to political
problems was prlrnsrlly pragmatic, did not accept the tourxlst
dogma, although his zeal for the realization of egalitarian
society made him acopt the Marxian view in a broad sense.
He was in favor of government control of those industries,
such as the mechanism of national credit, coal and electric
power, transport, and the ownership of lend, which were vital
to the national life#^^ 'fhe transformation of such key in-
dustries should be brou^t about by peaceful means, fthen
the British Labor Barty won the general election of 1945,
La ski exclaimed that "the Labor Party in their name /the
name of the people/ will seek to make a revolution by consent.
It will try to build the socialist commonwealth for the
creation of which it has a decisive mandate ty the process
25
of constitutional democracy*"
^
^Ibid . , p* 100.
^^Laskl, "Revolution by Consent", Nation , p. 552.
^^Laskl, "Great Britain* goes Socialist", Nation , V.
161, (August 4, 1945), p. 98.
75.
During Acrid Aar II » Laski alto expressed. In hit
open letter to the American students, the hope and poss-
ibility, however slim it might be, of revolution by consent
under the leadership of President Roosevelt in America. He
believed tnat the revolutionary character of the war made
the fundamental change of the social institutions easier
then before:
The first is that war itself has compelled profound
changes and so induced a mood in the nation that is
prepared for great experiment. Crisis always breaks
the cake of custcKn; md it is folly not to take ad-
vantage of the mood while it lasts.^^
Also to Laski, the mass of people seemed to be more willing
and able to use their political power to bring about the
basic social reform. Laski also hoped that those who poss-
ess the instruments of production would learn in due time
that, to live in peace, the sharp class distinctions had to
27disappear.
^®Laski, "Revolution by Consent", Nation, p. 560.
^"^Laski, The Strategy of Freedom (New York: Harper
& Bros., 1941), pp. 9^-lOU.
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CHiwPTER VI
COMCLU&IOM
As h& s boen mentioned above
^
i^aakl began bla career as
a proponent of ardent liberalism, in the earlier period of
his writing he devoted hla utmost efforts to meeting the
challenge of totalitarian philosophy; his arguments for
pluralism have to be appreciated, therefore. In this con-
text* It is true that his argument lacked a logical con-
sistency at tlme^ but, to the writer of this paper. It seems
to be a realistic modification of his view as he faced newer
problems rather than the lack of scholarly Insist*
He started his academic life as an ardent advocate of
Individual right and freedom, and ended up as a proponent
of socialism In order to secure common^good for the people
by setting up a certain standard below which nobody should
fall* However, this diange of outlook did not conflict with
his aim to maximize Individual happiness; It should bo noted
that It has been the general trend of the Western liberalism
which adopted a more positive role of government for the pro-
motion of public Interests*
In his argument for pluralism, granted that his aim for
the preservation of individual freedom was noble, he seems
to have failed to explain how the necessary coordination was
to be achieved among the various Institutions, namely many
conflicting Interest groups whose functions could impinge
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upon on© another. Such a failure, as a result, loft enough
roan to be criticized by such an unsparing critic as Herbert
Deane, who pointed out that the pluralism of LasWl "loaves
unsolved the basic problem •• who Is to decide when the acti-
vities of the church cease to be of concern to itself and
begin to affect persons outside the group. Granting the
practical Inadequacy of pluralism, we should not fall to
understand that the main aim of his argument was to prevent
the state from turning Into a false god by setting up the
state as superior and indifferent to its component indivi-
duals .
At times, when Laskl discussed the nature of the state,
his arguiuent pertaining to the aim of the state seems to
merge with th d; of the idealism which he was mainly attacking;
the influence of T. H. Green on Laskl in this respect cannot
be Ignored. But it was Green as a founder of Oxford Liberal-
ism rather than as a successor of German idealism who influ-
enced Laskl. With all the likeness to idealism In his dis-
cussion of the aim of the state, the method he proposed to
implement the aim of the state was almost diametrically
opposed to that of idealism, that is to say, his approach
was largely pragmatic. Even after he had adopted a near-
Marxist view, he was vlolertOy opposed to any restriction of
^Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laskl , p. 27.
freedom of thought. To Laeki,
this 1.8 not 8 static worlds and there la no means
of making it so. Curiosity^ discovery, invention,
all of these Jeopardise by their nature the founda-
tion of any society to which their results are
denied admission. Toleration is therefore not merely
desirable in itself, tut also politically wise, be-
cause no other atmosphere of activity offers the
assurance of peaceful adjustment.*
It was In 1941, when many branded him an orthodox
Marxist, that Laaki said himself, "understanding comes to
those only who have been permitted to examine without pen-
alty the clash of ideas in tlie market place. If their free
examination Is denied, the price is always paid in an easy
acceptance of naive dogma. If the toleration of a differ-
ent belief is a main attribute of liberalism, and if that
toleration has been denied in Soviet Russia, it could safely
be said that Laski has been in the camp of liberals rather
than in that of doctrinaire Marxism. If Laski sympathized
with Marxism, It was mainly by IderitifVlng himself with the
humanitarian aspect of Marxism. And if he were a Marxist,
at least he was a •Marxist with a difference" as one of his
4biographers mentioned.
^Laski, Liberty in the Modem State , p. 280.
^Laskl, The Strategy of Freed an , p. 14.
^Martin, Harold J^ski . p. 81 f.
Up, Martin also says ^n tiie same book that, Iia8ki*8 argument
might be derived from Marx, but at the final test he was a
follower of William Morris rather than of Lenin. If he was
a Marxist it was because, as his friend Louis Levy put it,
*the socialism of Karl Marx was essentially humanist,* and
Jeures, Blum, and Harold Laski were all socialists who empha-
7©
Naturally, Laskl waa oppoaed to auoh a almple formula
aa that it waa neoeeaary to build a email revolutionary
party which would, in tiie final resort, overthrow a govern*
ment civil war and set \jp & dictatorehip of the proletar-
iat* In spite of his often expressed diatruat of the
representative institution
,
an attempt to resort to a violent
means seemed rather immature to Laski, especially in a country
like IJ*ngland which has a long period of liberal tradition.®
Although Laski did not approve of the method which the
Bolshevik! had employed for their ascendence to power, Laski
more often than not ex {re seed his sympathy with the Soviet
Union, especially with its planned econoniy* Looking back on
the political ideas of Laski in the longer perspective, "it
is true that Laski traveled all the way from an individual-
ist propounding the theories of pluralist society to a near-
Marxist prepared to overlook the evils of totalitarian means
for the sake of its gains*"® How far Laski was willing to
sacrifice individual freedom for the realization of an
egalitarian society is not certain, but^ as the abandonment
sized 'this h\aman side of Marxism' and linked 'the inventor
of scientific socialism with the main current of French
Hevolutlonary thought*' Like i^^llllam Morris, he held^
that socialism anc felioftship are the same thing.** *
p* 256*
®Ibid* * p* 82*
®0* L* MethSf Harold Revisited (Ahmedabad, India:
Harolc Laski Institute of Foil t leal t>cience, 1960, iHablioa-
tlon No* 27 ) , p* 7*
80.
of pluralism shows rather clearly, he was ready to make some
concessions In the realm of Individual freedom and rights.
Granted that It was from his sincere desire to disseminate
the opportunities of self-realisation on a wider basis, still
It is true that he recoiled to some degree from the position
of an Individualist In favor of a greater degree of collect-
ivism. Thus La ski, disapproving of the dictatorial method
employed by the Soviet regime, praised the Russian revolution
as the Inheritor of the French Revolution, and believed that.
In the long run, freedom would prevail In Russia.
In 1846 Laskl said. In praise of planned economy, "free
enterprise and the market economy mean war; socialism and
planned eoonony mean peace. Vie must plan our civilization
n7
or we must perish. With so much emphasis on planned
economy. It Is not so clear how far he was willing to sacri-
fice Individual liberty and other political safeguards for
the preservation of democracy, because planned economy may
well lead to political collectivism. The dilemma was, as
put by Mr. Metha, who was once a student under Professor
Laskl and Indian Ambassador to the United States, "by re-
jecting both the democratic way and the Communist method,
he had nothing to fall back upon since he failed to evolve
an alternative In place of the means he rejected.
Laskl, "Plan or Perish", The Ration . CIAI (December
16, 1946), p. 661.
®0. L. Metha, 0£. clt . . p. 13.
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The dilemna of l^askl aeena, to the writer of this
paper, to have originated from his over-almpllficatlcti of
the western economic system, especially Its flexibility. It
has been evidenced since the conclusion of World War II that,
through the Institutions of representative government, es-
pecially in England, much social legislation has become
effective loading towards the goal of a welfare state. For
example, since 1945, the British society has undergone such
a change tliat the working-class In England appears to have
accepted the Institutions of representative democracy as
a means of improving its lot. The acceptance of welfare-
state philosophy by the British Conservative Farty seems
to have made the Labor Party less a ttractlve to the eyes
of working class people as evidenced by the successive
conservative victories In the Parliamentary elections. It
Is doubtful, but speculated by the writer of this paper,
that If Laskl lived today, he might have regained some of
his confidence In the flexibility and capacity of democratic
representative Institutions as a means of realizing Indivi-
dual happiness through peaceful means.
Looking backward, ton years after his death, we can
see some of his weakness; ho seems to have exaggerated his
capacity to Influence practical politics by writing pamphlets
and making speeches. "As a polltlcan Harold set his sights
wrong. He did not recognize the limitations of his method,
nor realize that he could not successfully combine the role
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of eminent grace with that of popular leader."® But as a
teacher he excelled the others In the world of learning.-
At times. It la regretted that he failed to reach scholarly
maturity by devoting much of hla time and energy to partisan
politics. Perhaps It Is txue that he "neglected those periods
of lonely thought out of which creative Ideas spring,"^® but
It should be remembered that, "Laakl was one of the few teach-
ers who sought to bring political science to earth, to relate
political concept to economic trends, and yet hitch the wagon
to the star.” as he was so successful and Influential as
a teacher. It said that hundreds of letters of sorrow and
gratitude poured In, not only from i^ngland, but also from
all over the world, upon the news of his unexpected death
In 1960.^^
In his political thinking. If La ski advocated a revo-
lution, It was a theory In the Lockean-Jefferaonlan rather
than Marxian sense. Therefore, to the writer of this paper.
It seems to be unfair for one to attempt to build him Into
a gaulelter commissar; on the contrary, his Influence as a
liberal democrat, at least throughout most of his lifetime,
with the rich heritage of liberal faith, seems to have
blocked the Inroads of revolutionary communism. What he
®Martln, Harold Laskl . p. 248.
^Q lbld .. p. 247.
^^0. L. Metha, clt .
.
p. 23.
Martin, clt .. p. 249.
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teaches us today Is the lesson thit democracy does not mean
mere maintenance of the status quo, but continual trans-
formation of our society to satisfy the basic needs of its
Individual members through peaceful and constitutional
means* Be also warns us that we must constantly guard
against the danger of any dogna, because it is an ob-
struction to progress* i^bove all, the greatest lesson
one can get from his teaching is that, as he so consistently
insisted, the individual should be an end in itself, but
never a means toward other ends however noble they may
appear*
B4
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